Assessing the Potential Impact of *Evenwel v. Abbott*

By Carl E. Klarner
Klarnerpolitics.com
Carl.Klarner@gmail.com

The U.S. Supreme Court will hear *Evenwel v. Abbott* on December 8, 2015.[1] If the high Court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, redistricting across the country will be accomplished by nearly equalizing the number of people *eligible* to vote in a jurisdiction instead of the current standard of nearly equalizing the total population of legislative districts. This analysis assesses the potential impact of such a ruling on the political power of African-Americans, Latinos, individuals residing in poverty, as well as the extent of the electoral advantages a ruling might provide to the Republican Party.

If the Supreme Court rules in favor of the plaintiffs, the largest groups that will be subtracted from a state's total population for redistricting purposes will be children and non-citizens.[2] It is likely that if asked to consider the question, many in the American public would have different attitudes about excluding children from population counts in comparison to excluding non-citizens from population counts. Denying children's interests in the representational process would likely strike a particularly strong normative chord with many Americans. Accordingly, this analysis examines both the impact of excluding each group separately, for state legislatures in all 50 states and the U.S. House of Representatives.

The analysis utilizes an original database that contains election results from all state legislative and Congressional districts from 1968 to 2015, as well as the race and ethnicity of all state legislators from 1968 to 2015. It also utilizes data extracted from the 2010-2014 American Community Survey mapped onto 2014 state legislative and Congressional districts, which was first publicly made available on December 3, 2015.

I estimate changes in legislative district representation by reweighting legislative seats on the basis of the proportion of a district's population comprised of citizens as well as the proportion of the district's population comprised of citizens of voting age (CVAP).

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Table 1 displays the main findings of this report. Tables with figures for all 50 states for the partisan consequences appear in Appendix C of this report.

Utilizing CVAP for districting counts would result in the following changes.

1) A 1.39% reduction in the percentage of Democrats in state legislative houses. Democrats currently represent 46.4% of the country, but excluding non-citizens and children from Census counts would reduce their strength to 45.0% of the country. Democrats in state senates currently represent 44.4% of the country, while they would represent 43.2% if CVAP was utilized for districting purposes. The U.S. House would go from having 43.2% Democrats to 42.1% by utilizing CVAP.

[1] Many thanks to Michael N. Myers (michaelnmyers@gmail.com) for extensive help with data collection on this project. Thanks to Daniel A. Smith (University of Florida) and Michael P. McDonald (University of Florida) for extensive comments.

[2] Other groups, too, would be excluded from redistricting population counts of eligible voters, including felons (in most states) and ex-felons (in several states), but data on the distribution of felons by state legislative district is not readily available.

2) Most of the partisan effect comes through excluding non-citizens, although a small but substantial effect is felt from excluding citizen children. I find that excluding only non-citizens, but not citizen children, from population counts would cost the Democrats an average seat penalty of 1.17 percent in state legislative houses, 1.01 percent in state legislative senates, and .88 percent in state congressional delegations. The compounded impact of excluding citizen children has roughly one-fourth the partisan impact compared to excluding non-citizens, although this impact varies substantially across states. On average, the Democratic penalty from excluding citizen children after excluding non-citizens is .22 percent for state legislative houses, .16 percent for state legislative senates, and .25 percent for state congressional delegations.
3) Geographically, and perhaps unsurprisingly given the locale of the *Evenwel* plaintiffs, the partisan impact of both of these adjustments when tabulating a state's total population are especially great in Texas.
4) Utilizing CVAP for districting would result in a 12% reduction in Latino state legislators and a 13% reduction in Latino U.S. Representatives. Latino state house members currently represent 8.4% of the United States, but excluding non-citizens and children from Census counts would reduce this percentage to 7.4%. Latino state senators currently represent 6.7% of the United States, but would represent 5.8% by excluding non-citizens and children. The analogous figures for the U.S. House are 6.7% shifting to 5.8%.
5) The incidence of majority-Latino districts would decline even more than for Latino legislators.
6) Latino voting power in the mass public would decline by 4.6% in the U.S. House, 5.2% in state senates and 6.2% in state houses.
7) The representation of African-Americans legislators would also decline, but by an amount approximately one-third that of Latino legislators. Black state house members currently represent 11.9% of the county, but excluding non-citizens and citizen children would reduce this percentage to 11.4%. Black state senate members represent 10.1% of the country, but would represent 9.6% by utilizing CVAP. African-Americans constitute 9.7% of the U.S. House, but would constitute 9.3% by utilizing CVAP.
8) African-American voting power in the mass public would go down between 1.3% in the U.S. House to 1.9% in state houses.
9) Districts currently represented by Asian-American legislators would be largely unaltered in size by shifting Census counts to CVAP. About a 5% reduction in Asian majority districts was estimated, but there are so few of these that the overall shift would be small. The voting power of Asian-Americans would decline by somewhere between 1% and 1.5%.
10) Overall, the representation of native-Americans does not appear to be hurt by the shift.
11) Not surprisingly, white non-Latinos would benefit from the shift. White non-Latino majority districts currently represent 69.8% of the county in state houses, but would expand to 72.0% by excluding non-citizens and citizen children. Majority white non-Latino state senate districts would go from covering 71.6% to 73.7% of the country. For the U.S. House, the shift would go from 73.3% to 75.0% of the country.

12) There are essentially no districts with a majority of people in poverty in the country. But the voting power of people in poverty would be reduced by between 1% and 1.5% with a shift to CVAP for districting.
13) The percent of the country covered by "majority low income" districts—districts where more than 50% of the people have incomes below 200% of the poverty line—would decline by about 10%. The voting power of this group, who constitute 34.6% of the U.S. population, would decline by between .9% and 1.3%, depending on the office.

Recent preliminary analysis by Andrew B. Beveridge (2015) suggests similar findings, but I use more recent Census data for this report, allowing better estimates of the impact that *Evenwel* might have in state legislatures. More importantly, Beveridge did not have data on the party of legislators representing each state legislative district for 46 states. Although the two studies are similar in their overall approach, Appendix B details several other differences between the two reports, including some methodological problems with how Beveridge conducted his study. Another analysis of the impact of *Evenwel* was conducted by PEW, but it only examined the U.S. House and did not consider the separate impacts of excluding non-citizens and citizen children.[3]

THEORY

The notion that counting only citizens (or only citizens above the age of 18) would benefit Republicans and diminish the representation of racial and ethnic minorities or those socioeconomically disadvantaged is well understood. Non-citizens and those under the age of 18 tend to live in areas near racial/ethnic minorities, especially Latinos, who are strongly Democratic in their voting behavior. According to the 2014 American Community Survey, 7.0 percent of people in the United States are non-citizens.[4]

If the percent of non-citizens and citizen children does not vary substantially across state and congressional legislative districts, the effect of excluding non-citizens and citizen children from districting counts will be minimal. But there is considerable variation across legislative districts in the percent of non-citizens, as well as the under-18 population. For instance, the standard deviation of the percent of people in districts who are non-citizens is 5.9 percent for the U.S. House, 6.3 percent for state senates, and 6.8 percent for state houses. But it is worth mentioning that our intuitions about the distribution of non-citizens might be inadequate, because variation across states does not matter. Only variation within states can affect the representation of any group, since *Evenwel* might only influence district drawing within states. Taking the average of the standard deviation in the percent of non-citizens in each state, for example, is a more informative statistic. This figure shows substantially less variation in non-citizens: 3.9 percent for the U.S. House, 4.5 percent for state senates, and 5.1 percent for state houses.

Perhaps more importantly, the political consequence of excluding citizen children from population counts for the purposes of redistricting has received considerably less attention than the potential impact of excluding non-citizens. First, among citizens, the percentage of children who are either non-white or white and Latino is higher than among adults. Among citizen children, 47.3 percent are either non-white or Latino, while among adult citizens, 30.3 percent

[3] http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/06/03/supreme-court-could-reshape-voting-districts-with-big-impact-on-hispanics/, accessed Nov 18, 2015.
[4] 1-year average, Table B05001.

are racial or ethnic minorities.[5] Some of this gap is because non-citizens often have citizen children. In fact, an auxiliary analysis to the one done below indicates that the higher the proportion of non-citizens in a legislative district, the higher the proportion of citizens who are children.[6] Age is also related to socio-economic status. The most recent Census data are not available broken down by poverty, citizenship status, and age, but among non-Latino whites, 13.0 percent of children were in poverty in 2014, while 10.3 percent of white adults were. Since race/ethnicity and income are all related to vote choice, it seems likely that areas with larger percentages of children would be more likely to elect Democrats.

In contrast to these ideas, one might think that the proportion of children in districts within states do not vary much. If the proportion is more or less constant, then it cannot be correlated with politically relevant characteristics at the district level. There is less variation in the proportion of citizen children than non-citizens, but it is not as lopsided as one might think. The average state has a standard deviation of 2.0 percent for the U.S. House, 2.8 percent for state senates and 3.4 percent for state houses.[7] Variation in the percentage of citizens who are children is over half that of variation in non-citizens for all three institutions.[8]

There are good reasons to believe that excluding non-citizens and children from redistricting counts would have a greater impact on state legislatures than the U.S. House. In nearly every state there are many more state legislative districts than Congressional districts. This implies that incremental changes in counting types of people within states would plausibly have more impact in state legislatures. At the extreme, the seven states with just one Congressional district cannot be affected by the *Evenwel* ruling. Nine states have more than one Congressional district, but currently have representatives from only one party, Massachusetts being the most noteworthy example. Although future elections may split these delegations, reweighting the population districts based on citizenship has less chance of altering the relative compositional balance between the parties in state legislatures than in the U.S. House.

METHODOLOGY

The following analysis is conducted on the districts in place for the 2014 elections, and the legislators who held office following the November 2015 elections.[9] It reweights population utilizing citizenship and age figures from the 2010-2014 5-year averages of the American Community Survey (ACS), conducted by the U.S. Census, which was made publicly available

---

[5] 2014 ACS, one year average for the entire United States, computations from Tables B05003 and B05003H for race/ethnicity, and Tables B17001 and B17001A for poverty. Looking at all races/ethnicities, 21.7 percent of children were in poverty while 13.6 percent of adults were in poverty.

[6] The correlation coefficients are .35 for state senates, .34 for state houses, and .55 for U.S. House districts, all statistically significant ($p<.000$). If more parents are citizens, they contribute to a larger denominator in that fraction.

[7] The standard deviations across the country are the following percentages: 2.7 for the U.S. House, 3.3 for state senates, and 3.9 for state houses.

[8] One might imagine that more conservative and traditional Republican voters would have more children on average than Democrats, and so areas with more children would actually have Republican representatives. As I show, for state houses, the state where Democrats are most advantaged by excluding children is Utah. Utah also ranks high in this regard for state senates. What is driving these relationships is beyond the scope of this analysis, but, if it is true, the possibility that people with more traditional values might have larger families is overshadowed by other factors when it comes to the nationwide impact.

[9] Replacements of state legislators mid-session who switched and resulted in a change in the characteristics of a seat's legislator are not taken into account.

on December 3, 2015 for state legislative district data.[10] The data released on December 3, 2015 were also the first Census data to be mapped onto 2014 state legislative districts. Utilizing the 2014 districts was especially important, because five states redistricted both their state legislative chambers for the 2014 elections. These were Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, Montana and Pennsylvania. Additionally, 14 state house districts were redrawn in Texas, the state from which *Evenwel* originated.[11]

Legislators are reweighted utilizing the following formula when the counter-factual is excluding non-citizens from population counts: A / B, where A is equal to the proportion of a district's population that is citizen, and B is equal to the average proportion of citizens across districts in the state for the office in question.[12] The formula for reweighting when the counter-factual is excluding both non-citizens and citizen children from population counts merely substitutes "proportion of a district's population that is a citizen of voting age" (CVAP) for A, etc.

Specifically, after reweighting, the number of African-Americans, Latino, Asian, Democratic and Republican legislators in each state are then computed for state senates, state houses and for the U.S. House of Representatives. The number of majority-black, majority-Latino, and majority-Asian districts are also computed after the reweighting. After computing percentages of each group in each state, these figures are compared to the current percentages of such legislators. Note also that U.S. House members are only re-weighted on the basis of comparisons within their state. It appears that *Evenwel* does not attempt to alter congressional apportionment, but only the one-person/one-vote rule within individual states.[13] If there is a relationship between how malapportioned districts are now with the percentage of racial minorities in a district (there is), the change from counting population to CVAP would interact with this, but in complex ways that are not reflected in the conflation of the two phenomena.

---

[10] Table B05003.

[11] Unfortunately, another complication for the analysis utilizing 2014 state legislative districts is that "holdover" state senators elected in 2012, but still in office for the 2015-2016 biennium (in Kentucky, Montana and Pennsylvania) have been elected under the 2000s districts. They were assigned 2014 districts as "holdover districts," but the specific state senators who represent these districts might have been different had the new districts been in place for the 2012 elections. This makes estimates of counter-factuals more tenuous for these three chambers.

[12] For state legislative chambers that do not have the same number of legislators elected from each district, this average is weighted by the number of seats in each district. These chambers are the Vermont Senate, and the state houses of Maryland, New Hampshire, South Dakota, Vermont, and West Virginia.

[13] An alternative approach would be to sum non-citizens across districts, divide by the number of seats in a legislative chamber, and use that as the ideal number of citizens in each district. On the basis of that, a fraction would be added or subtracted from the legislator or legislators in each district to accomplish the re-weighting. However, this is not a good idea. The purpose of this analysis is to try and isolate the effect of excluding non-citizens and children citizens from population counts when implementing one-person/one-vote. The approach considered in this paragraph would conflate the malapportionment allowed in state legislative districts (plus or minus five percent is generally allowed), inter-censual population shifts, and differences between the ACS and decennial census with the effect that is being assessed here. Imagine that a district had 4% fewer people in it than the average district before re-computing on the basis of CVAP. After re-computing, the district is 8% smaller than the average district. One would not then want to assume that the district in question will lose 8% of its voting power.

There are obvious flaws with the current method.[14] Numerous complex factors would interact with the different method of counting to result in an impact. Of lesser importance, but still a problem, disenfranchised felons (and those felons who have not had their voting rights restored) are not taken into account in the re-weighting.

For legal purposes, the total number of African-Americans and other minorities include individuals of two or more races, one of which is African-American, etc.[15] This is reflected in the designation of which legislative districts are majority-minority.

For the analysis of voting power for different categories of people in the mass public, the following formula is utilized; (A/B) / (C/D), where A is the number of seats in a chamber, B is the number of people living in the area covered by the legislative chamber, C is the number of seats in a particular district, and D is the number of people living in a district.[16] "C" is adjusted with the weights described above, and the resultant average voting power for different categories of people utilizing different methods of counting population are compared.

Last, to assess the nationwide impact of changes in population counting on all of the outcomes examined, state level figures are always weighted by state population when being averaged to the nation level. This is done to approximate the importance of a particular state legislative chamber. All else being equal, the Democrats would rather have control over the California state legislature than the Oregon state legislature, etc. National figures for the U.S. House are weighted by the number of U.S. House seats in a state, since it is assumed that each seat has equal power.

The issue of weighting by population is especially relevant to assessing minority representation, as it makes a big difference. Reports of minority state legislators frequently state them as a percentage of all legislators in the country.[17] It is also sometimes asserted that descriptive representation is lower in state legislatures than in the U.S. House. But it is important to take the varying size of state legislative districts into account. For example, there are currently 498 African-American state house members, or 9.2% of the 5,411 state house members in the United States. But African-American state house members actually represent 11.9% of the United States, if you factor in the size of the districts they represent. This is substantially closer to the 13.7% of the United States that is African-American.[18] The simple reason for this is that Northeastern states, with unusually large state houses, have few African-Americans living in them. Looking at minority descriptive representation in this way gives us more insight into what types of electoral arrangements are conducive to the fair representation of racial minorities. It is probably much more helpful to African-Americans to have a legislator who is looking out for their interests who has one of 80 votes in the California Assembly—the legislature to one of the largest economies in the world—than in the New Hampshire House of Representatives with its 400 members. The figures in Table 1 indicate that the smaller districts in state houses are generally more effective at electing minorities than the larger state senate districts, or the even larger districts in the U.S. House.

---

[14] A superior approach to the one conducted here would be to conduct a simulation, which is beyond the scope of the current analysis. Although such an approach would be preferable to the one taken here, it is worth noting some aspects of the current approach that would yield more accurate estimates than a simulation, which are mentioned in Appendix A.

[15] http://www.publicmapping.org/resources/data, accessed December 3, 2015.

[16] New Hampshire's floterial districts are excluded from this analysis.

[17] An example of the former only is at http://www.gmcl.org/maps/national/state.htm, accessed December 5, 2015.

[18] As a percent of all state legislators (unweighted), blacks, Latinos and Asian attain the following percentages; State Houses; blacks 9.2%, Latinos 3.9, Asians 1.5. State senates; blacks 8.3, Latinos 3.4, Asians 1.7.

FINDINGS

Column three of Table 1 reports quantities as they are now. Column four reports the same quantity after re-weighting legislators on the basis of excluding non-citizens from redistricting counts. Column five shows the difference between these two amounts. Column six reports various quantities after re-weighting legislators after excluding both non-citizens and citizen children from districting counts. Column seven shows the differences between values arrived at by excluding non-citizens (column four) and values arrived at by excluding both non-citizens and citizen children (column six). Column eight indicates the percent reduction between column three and column six. For example, a quantity going from 4% to 3% would have a value of 33.3% in column eight. Positive values in difference columns (five, seven and eight) indicate a reduction in the thing listed in column one.

Table 1: Consequences of Re-Weighting Legislators by Excluding Non-Citizens as Well as Citizen Children from Districting Counts

	office	Current Value	Weighting By Citizens	Difference between 3 and 4	Weighting by CVAP	Difference between 4 and 6	% Reduction between 3 and 6
Latino % of Population		16.92					
Latino Legislator %	State HS	8.39	7.80	0.59	7.42	0.38	11.55
Latino Legislator %	State Sen	6.66	6.15	0.52	5.83	0.31	12.43
Latino Legislator %	US HS	6.67	6.17	0.49	5.79	0.38	13.17
Latino Majority District %	State HS	8.67	7.82	0.85	7.16	0.66	17.40
Latino Majority District %	State Sen	7.87	7.23	0.64	6.74	0.49	14.34
Latino Majority District %	US HS	7.82	7.18	0.64	6.67	0.50	14.60
Latino Influence District %	State HS	5.99	5.83	0.16	5.71	0.12	4.60
Latino Influence District %	State Sen	6.60	6.37	0.23	6.18	0.19	6.39
Latino Influence District %	US HS	5.98	5.88	0.10	5.74	0.15	4.02
Latino Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.96		0.94		6.18
Latino Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	0.97		0.95		5.18
Latino Voting Power	US HS	1.00	0.98		0.96		4.61
Black % of Population		13.66					
Black Legislator %	State HS	11.87	11.66	0.21	11.41	0.25	3.87
Black Legislator %	State Sen	10.08	9.81	0.27	9.60	0.21	4.76
Black Legislator %	US HS	9.66	9.40	0.25	9.26	0.14	4.08
Black Majority District %	State HS	7.86	7.81	0.05	7.69	0.11	2.16
Black Majority District %	State Sen	6.92	6.85	0.07	6.75	0.10	2.40
Black Majority District %	US HS	6.67	6.58	0.08	6.50	0.08	2.47
Black Minority Influence District %	State HS	2.81	2.72	0.09	2.63	0.09	6.29
Black Minority Influence District %	State Sen	3.20	3.09	0.12	3.01	0.08	6.13
Black Minority Influence District %	US HS	2.53	2.45	0.08	2.38	0.07	6.07
Black Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.99		0.98		1.94
Black Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	0.99		0.98		1.75
Black Voting Power	US HS	1.00	1.00		0.99		1.27

Asian Population %		5.91					
Asian Legislator %	State HS	2.25	2.16	0.08	2.23	-0.07	0.70
Asian Legislator %	State Sen	1.85	1.85	0.00	1.88	-0.03	-1.12
Asian Legislator %	US HS	2.07	2.04	0.03	2.06	-0.03	0.22
Asian Majority District %	State HS	0.71	0.67	0.05	0.68	-0.01	4.99
Asian Majority District %	State Sen	0.40	0.38	0.03	0.38	0.00	5.15
Asian Majority District %	US HS	0.46	0.43	0.03	0.44	0.00	4.48
Asian Influence District %	State HS	0.71	0.68	0.02	0.70	-0.02	0.79
Asian Influence District %	State Sen	0.80	0.78	0.02	0.83	-0.05	-3.82
Asian Influence District %	US HS	0.69	0.67	0.02	0.68	-0.01	1.25
Asian Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.98		0.99		1.49
Asian Voting Power	State Sen	1.01	0.99		0.99		1.45
Asian Voting Power	US HS	1.00	0.99		0.99		0.87
Native American Population %		1.67					
Native American Maj. District %	State HS	0.21	0.22	-0.01	0.21	0.02	3.47
Native American Maj. District %	State Sen	0.18	0.19	-0.01	0.17	0.01	3.24
Native American Maj. District %	US HS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Native American Inf. District %	State HS	0.04	0.03	0.00	0.03	0.00	0.93
Native American Inf. District %	State Sen	0.04	0.04	0.00	0.04	0.00	0.35
Native American Inf. District %	US HS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Native American Voting Power	State HS	1.00	1.00		1.00		-0.02
Native American Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	1.00		1.00		-0.05
Native American Voting Power	US HS	1.01	1.02		1.02		-0.49
Minority Population %		37.21					
Minority Majority District %	State HS	30.21	28.88	1.33	27.97	0.91	7.43
Minority Majority District %	State Sen	28.42	27.16	1.26	26.34	0.82	7.31
Minority Majority District %	US HS	26.67	25.68	0.98	25.02	0.67	6.19
Minority Influence District %	State HS	14.16	14.30	-0.14	14.47	-0.17	-2.21
Minority Influence District %	State Sen	15.94	16.14	-0.20	16.34	-0.19	-2.50
Minority Influence District %	US HS	17.93	17.97	-0.04	18.13	-0.16	-1.13
Minority Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.98		0.96		3.66
Minority Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	0.98		0.97		3.14
Minority Voting Power	US HS	1.00	0.99		0.98		2.60
White Non-Latino Population %		62.79					
White Non-Latino Maj. District %	State HS	69.79	71.12	-1.33	72.03	-0.91	-3.22
White Non-Latino Maj. District %	State Sen	71.58	72.84	-1.26	73.66	-0.82	-2.90
White Non-Latino Maj. District %	US HS	73.33	74.32	-0.98	74.98	-0.67	-2.25
White Non-Latino Influence District %	State HS	10.03	9.83	0.19	9.79	0.04	2.37
White Non-Latino Influence District %	State Sen	10.63	10.39	0.24	10.25	0.14	3.60
White Non-Latino Influence District %	US HS	10.57	10.51	0.07	10.44	0.07	1.28
White Non-Latino Voting Power	State HS	1.00	1.01		1.02		-2.08
White Non-Latino Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	1.01		1.02		-1.70
White Non-Latino Voting Power	US HS	1.00	1.01		1.02		-1.46

Poverty Population %		15.65					
Poverty Majority District %	State HS	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	22.92
Poverty Majority District %	State Sen	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Poverty Majority District %	US HS	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Poverty Influence District %	State HS	2.52	2.35	0.16	2.21	0.14	12.11
Poverty Influence District %	State Sen	0.89	0.83	0.06	0.75	0.08	16.31
Poverty Influence District %	US HS	0.23	0.20	0.03	0.17	0.03	24.88
Poverty Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.99		0.98		1.56
Poverty Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	0.99		0.99		1.27
Poverty Voting Power	US HS	1.00	1.00		0.99		1.02
% Below 200% of the Poverty Line		34.62					
Poverty 200% Majority District %	State HS	13.42	12.66	0.77	12.06	0.60	10.18
Poverty 200% Majority District %	State Sen	10.83	10.22	0.60	9.71	0.51	10.29
Poverty 200% Majority District %	US HS	7.36	6.85	0.50	6.40	0.45	12.95
Poverty 200% Influence District %	State HS	35.57	35.63	-0.06	35.79	-0.16	-0.63
Poverty 200% Influence District %	State Sen	37.64	37.63	0.01	37.67	-0.04	-0.09
Poverty 200% Influence District %	US HS	39.77	39.85	-0.08	40.00	-0.14	-0.57
Poverty 200% Voting Power	State HS	1.00	0.99		0.98		1.34
Poverty 200% Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	0.99		0.99		1.08
Poverty 200% Voting Power	US HS	1.00	1.00		0.99		0.86
Female Voting Power	State HS	1.00	1.00		1.00		0.06
Female Voting Power	State Sen	1.00	1.00		1.00		0.10
Female Voting Power	US HS	1.00	1.00		1.00		0.06
Democrat Legislator %	State HS	46.38	45.21	1.17	44.99	0.22	3.01
Democrat Legislator %	State Sen	44.38	43.37	1.01	43.20	0.16	2.64
Democrat Legislator %	US HS	43.22	42.34	0.88	42.09	0.25	2.60

The values in Table 2 are sorted by how pro-Republican the shift would be, within each of the three offices. The few states where Democrats actually benefit from excluding non-citizens are at the top of Table 2, while states where Republicans are advantaged appear later in the list.

Tables 2 and 3 indicate that there is a lot of variation in the impact of excluding citizen children. Almost all states see a Republican advantage when non-citizens are excluded, but 62 out of 148 states and offices see Democrats advantaged by excluding citizen children. The net impact of excluding citizen children is to help the Republicans, however, especially in states with large immigrant populations, such as Texas, Nevada and Arizona.

CONCLUSION

There is another possible consequence of the Evenwel case, if the Supreme Court essentially maintains the status quo—in other words, a ruling that states be allowed to determine for themselves who will be counted when making legislative districts more or less equal in constituents. It is possible that the attention this case brings to the issue will energize Republican activists and politicians to exercise their ability at the state level to exclude non-citizens, and perhaps even children, from population counts for the purposes of redistricting in 2021. Given the increased polarization of the state parties and the increased insulation of state government elected officials (Klarner and Evans 2015), Republican dominated state governments could

change the criteria they utilize for redistricting counts in 2021 with minimal fear of not only judicial, but electoral retribution as well.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Beveridge, Andrew A. 2015. The Threat to Representation for Children and Non-Citizens: An Analysis of the Potential Impact of Evenwel v. Abbott on Redistricting.

Klarner, Carl E., and Heather Evans. 2015. "The Polarization and Nationalization of State Elections, 1971-2014." http://klarnerpolitics.com/, accessed December 5, 2015.

APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES

The question of what representation would look like in the future if VAP or CVAP or anything else were utilized instead of total population is extremely complex. The impact of the rate of adults in different locales on representation by politically relevant characteristics is contingent on how these locales are positioned relative to each other, etc. Both re-weighting legislative districts and also smaller units of geography are worth doing to shed as much light on this question as possible.

In reality districts have a certain amount of "staying power" between redistricting regimes because of geographic features (rivers, ridges), concerns about compactness, contiguity, race, incumbency protection, etc. Because of this, re-weighting by CVAP at the legislative district level favors a story where districts tend to keep their basic structure when utilizing VAP instead of total population. Districts would shrink and expand somewhat, and representation of politically relevant groups would be influenced, but in a way that is best informed by focusing on districts.

In contrast, utilizing CVAP instead of total population might radically alter the structure of districts, so that they must be rebuilt from the ground up. If the percent of CVAP varies greatly in different parts of a state, the basic structure of districts might be radically redrawn. Examining areas that are as small as possible would provide more insight into a radically redrawn map. In the example of the two districts above, if the people living in the locales with 60 percent adults shared some politically relevant characteristic, their diminished representation would be missed in an analysis at the district level. If such locales are contiguous, they might be put into the same districts and see their representation go down a great deal.

While the best way to address these issues is by doing a simulation of possible different plans utilizing either VAP or population, such an analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Such an analysis would have to take into account geographic features, compactness considerations, respect for political subdivisions, etc. (considerations whose importance varies by state), which no simulation analysis has successfully taken into account to date.

APPENDIX B: COMPARISON WITH BEVERIDGE REPORT

As stated, Beveridge did not have access to the same data that was available for this study. As a consequence, he only conducted the re-weighting procedure for four states in his analyses of state legislatures, while using an approximate method for the other states. This is what he says; "This analysis could be conducted for any state, where the party affiliations of representatives are known. More states will be added as time permits. Unlike congressional representatives, there is no easily available file of the party affiliations of **all** state legislators in the United States."

Another difference between our studies is how Beveridge creates the counter-factual of how many seats Democrats and Republicans would attain if redistricting was done by CVAP instead of total population. The manner in which he does so conflates the malapportionment that exists for state legislative districts currently with the changes in districting that would occur if CVAP is utilized instead of total population. Consider what he does. "This computation is done by summing up the district surpluses and deficits based upon the new eligible-voter based average district size and sorting them by party control." But some portion of the district surpluses and deficits that result after establishing the new district CVAP populations would be caused by current malapportionment in district size. The portion of re-weighting of Democratic and Republican legislators he conducts that is the consequence of that current malapportionment is not brought about by counting CVAP versus total population.

One difference between this report and the Beveridge report is that Beveridge used data that would have been available for the drawing of the 2010s districts at the beginning of the decade. There are advantages to doing it that way. But the best way to assess the future effect of Evenwel if it is applied to the 2020s redistricting is to use the most up-to-date data. Accordingly, the 2010-2014 ACS was utilized here, in contrast to the 2006-2010 ACS, utilized by Beveridge. I considered taking Beveridge's approach, but it wasn't clear to me that the 2006-2010 ACS data would have been available when the decennial census was. In fact, the 2006-2010 ACS five year averages were made public on December 8, 2011, while block data from the decennial census data was sent to the states between February 3 and March 24, 2011.[19] Furthermore, the 2006-2010 ACS block level data released at that time was weighted by the 2000 Census, not the 2010 Census, although I'm not able to find a citation establishing this at the moment. Blocks change substantially between decennial censuses, although block groups are more constant.

Next, if the Supreme Court ruled that all districts in the entire country be redrawn right now—which I find unlikely—it is more likely that they would order the use of the 2008-2012 ACS, not the 2006-2010 ACS. It would generate a more accurate picture of 2010 than a five year average generated from 2006-2010.

Next, the number of people in a Census block that is non-citizen isn't reported by the U.S. Census, which is why Beveridge had to estimate this for blocks, and then map it onto state legislative districts. But the Census uses information that it does not publicly release to create estimates of state legislative district data, such as the number of non-citizens in SLDs. This means that simply utilizing the SLD U.S. Census data instead of computing this on one's own is going to be more accurate.

The problem with utilizing the U.S. Census's SLD estimates is that before December 3, 2015, the ACS releases had only been mapped onto 2012 state legislative districts, not 2014 state

[19] See https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/acs/news/data-releases/2010/release-schedule.html for the ACS release date, and http://www.census.gov/population/www/cen2010/glance/ for when the decennial Census was released to the states, both accessed December 3, 2015.

legislative districts. To be clear, a file that defines which blocks are included in 2014 state legislative districts—what Beveridge used—had been released for a quite a while before December 3, but that is different than what I'm referring to. The fact the ACS had not been mapped onto 2014 districts was a problem because five states—Alaska, Kentucky, Maine, Montana, and Pennsylvania—redistricted both of their legislative chambers for the 2014 elections. An additional 14 districts were redrawn for the 2014 elections in the Texas state house, particularly relevant as the state Evenwel originates from. As a result, I made the decision to wait for the December 3, 2015 data to do a final analysis, although this was uncomfortably close to December 8, 2015.

APPENDIX C: STATE TABLES

Table 2: Percent of Major-Party Legislative Seats Held by Democrats when Excluding Non-Citizens from Redistricting Counts by State and Office

Office	State	Current Democratic Percentage of Legislators	Democratic % of Legislators if Non-Citizens Excluded From Districting Counts	Republican Advantage: Column 3 subtracted by Column 4
State Sen	Arkansas	34.29	34.52	-0.23
State Sen	Alabama	22.86	22.98	-0.12
State Sen	South Dakota	22.86	22.94	-0.09
State Sen	Mississippi	40.38	40.47	-0.08
State Sen	South Carolina	40.00	40.08	-0.08
State Sen	Louisiana	35.90	35.89	0.01
State Sen	Montana	42.00	41.96	0.04
State Sen	Hawaii	96.00	95.91	0.09
State Sen	North Dakota	31.91	31.80	0.11
State Sen	Ohio	30.30	30.19	0.11
State Sen	West Virginia	50.00	49.89	0.11
State Sen	Vermont	70.00	69.88	0.12
State Sen	Kentucky	31.58	31.40	0.18
State Sen	Idaho	20.00	19.81	0.19
State Sen	Indiana	20.00	19.81	0.19
State Sen	Wyoming	13.33	13.12	0.21
State Sen	Iowa	52.00	51.78	0.22
State Sen	Washington	48.98	48.69	0.29
State Sen	Maine	42.86	42.55	0.31
State Sen	Michigan	28.95	28.62	0.33
State Sen	Oklahoma	16.67	16.32	0.34
State Sen	Delaware	57.14	56.71	0.44
State Sen	Kansas	20.00	19.53	0.47
State Sen	Georgia	32.14	31.67	0.48
State Sen	Missouri	26.47	25.99	0.48
State Sen	New Mexico	59.52	59.02	0.50
State Sen	New Hampshire	41.67	41.15	0.52
State Sen	Tennessee	15.15	14.59	0.56
State Sen	Wisconsin	42.42	41.85	0.58
State Sen	Pennsylvania	40.00	39.40	0.60
State Sen	Alaska	30.00	29.40	0.60
State Sen	Minnesota	58.21	57.54	0.67
State Sen	Oregon	60.00	59.29	0.71
State Sen	Massachusetts	85.00	84.27	0.73
State Sen	Rhode Island	86.49	85.74	0.74
State Sen	North Carolina	32.00	31.20	0.80
State Sen	California	65.00	64.05	0.95

State Sen	Connecticut	58.33	57.37	0.96
State Sen	Utah	17.24	16.13	1.12
State Sen	Colorado	48.57	47.32	1.25
State Sen	Florida	35.00	33.74	1.26
State Sen	Illinois	66.10	64.69	1.41
State Sen	Maryland	70.21	68.67	1.54
State Sen	Virginia	47.50	45.82	1.68
State Sen	Texas	35.48	33.67	1.82
State Sen	Arizona	43.33	41.40	1.94
State Sen	New Jersey	60.00	57.88	2.12
State Sen	Nevada	47.62	44.85	2.77
State Sen	New York	49.21	46.19	3.02
State HS	Arkansas	36.00	36.22	-0.22
State HS	South Carolina	37.10	37.31	-0.21
State HS	Louisiana	40.78	40.87	-0.09
State HS	West Virginia	36.00	36.03	-0.03
State HS	Alabama	31.43	31.46	-0.03
State HS	Mississippi	39.34	39.32	0.02
State HS	Idaho	20.00	19.98	0.02
State HS	Montana	41.00	40.94	0.06
State HS	Wyoming	15.00	14.88	0.12
State HS	South Dakota	17.14	17.01	0.13
State HS	North Dakota	24.47	24.31	0.16
State HS	Vermont	62.50	62.33	0.17
State HS	Kentucky	54.00	53.83	0.17
State HS	Maine	53.74	53.50	0.24
State HS	Oklahoma	28.71	28.44	0.28
State HS	Ohio	34.34	34.06	0.28
State HS	Michigan	42.73	42.37	0.36
State HS	Delaware	60.98	60.55	0.43
State HS	Hawaii	84.31	83.88	0.43
State HS	Missouri	28.22	27.73	0.49
State HS	Georgia	34.08	33.59	0.49
State HS	New Hampshire	40.10	39.60	0.50
State HS	Indiana	29.00	28.49	0.51
State HS	Iowa	43.00	42.44	0.56
State HS	Tennessee	26.26	25.70	0.56
State HS	Pennsylvania	41.38	40.81	0.57
State HS	Alaska	41.03	40.43	0.59
State HS	Utah	16.00	15.39	0.61
State HS	Wisconsin	36.36	35.72	0.64
State HS	Washington	52.04	51.38	0.66
State HS	North Carolina	38.33	37.62	0.71
State HS	Kansas	22.40	21.69	0.71
State HS	Rhode Island	85.14	84.39	0.74
State HS	Oregon	58.33	57.47	0.86

State HS	New Mexico	47.14	46.27	0.88
State HS	Minnesota	46.27	45.36	0.91
State HS	Colorado	52.31	51.20	1.10
State HS	Massachusetts	77.50	76.37	1.13
State HS	Florida	32.50	31.12	1.38
State HS	Connecticut	57.62	56.16	1.45
State HS	Virginia	34.00	32.54	1.46
State HS	Illinois	60.17	58.51	1.66
State HS	California	65.00	63.20	1.80
State HS	Maryland	64.54	62.74	1.80
State HS	Arizona	40.00	38.09	1.91
State HS	New Jersey	65.00	63.04	1.96
State HS	Texas	34.67	32.43	2.23
State HS	New York	70.67	68.18	2.49
State HS	Nevada	40.48	37.98	2.50
US HS	New Mexico	66.67	67.14	-0.47
US HS	Alabama	14.29	14.37	-0.09
US HS	Mississippi	25.00	25.08	-0.08
US HS	South Carolina	14.29	14.34	-0.05
US HS	Iowa	25.00	25.03	-0.03
US HS	New Hampshire	50.00	50.00	0.00
US HS	Kansas	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Oklahoma	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Arkansas	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Delaware	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Vermont	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	West Virginia	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	South Dakota	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Hawaii	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	North Dakota	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Idaho	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Connecticut	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Wyoming	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Alaska	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Massachusetts	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Rhode Island	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Montana	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Utah	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Georgia	28.57	28.55	0.02
US HS	Minnesota	62.50	62.34	0.16
US HS	Louisiana	16.67	16.50	0.17
US HS	Maine	50.00	49.83	0.17
US HS	Washington	60.00	59.76	0.24
US HS	Michigan	35.71	35.44	0.27
US HS	Ohio	25.00	24.71	0.29
US HS	Missouri	25.00	24.67	0.33

US HS	Colorado	42.86	42.50	0.35
US HS	Kentucky	16.67	16.31	0.36
US HS	Indiana	22.22	21.85	0.37
US HS	Oregon	80.00	79.60	0.40
US HS	Wisconsin	37.50	37.06	0.44
US HS	Nebraska	33.33	32.88	0.46
US HS	Pennsylvania	27.78	27.23	0.55
US HS	Tennessee	22.22	21.59	0.63
US HS	Maryland	87.50	86.81	0.69
US HS	North Carolina	23.08	22.38	0.70
US HS	Florida	37.04	36.26	0.78
US HS	California	73.58	72.31	1.27
US HS	Virginia	27.27	25.73	1.54
US HS	Illinois	55.56	54.01	1.54
US HS	Arizona	44.44	42.73	1.71
US HS	Texas	30.56	28.57	1.98
US HS	New York	66.67	64.36	2.31
US HS	New Jersey	50.00	47.51	2.49
US HS	Nevada	25.00	22.44	2.56

Table 3: Percent of Major-Party Legislative Seats Held by Democrats when Excluding Citizen Children from Redistricting Counts by State and Office

Office	State	Current Democratic Percentage of Legislators	Democratic % of Legislators if Non-Citizens Excluded From Districting Counts	Democratic % of Legislators if Both Non-Citizens and Citizen Children Excluded From Districting Counts	Republican Advantage: Column 4 subtracted by Column 5
State Sen	Washington	48.98	48.69	50.10	-1.41
State Sen	Idaho	20.00	19.81	21.09	-1.28
State Sen	Utah	17.24	16.13	17.14	-1.02
State Sen	Minnesota	58.21	57.54	58.18	-0.64
State Sen	California	65.00	64.05	64.66	-0.60
State Sen	Ohio	30.30	30.19	30.69	-0.50
State Sen	Oregon	60.00	59.29	59.77	-0.48
State Sen	Maine	42.86	42.55	42.97	-0.42
State Sen	Iowa	52.00	51.78	52.16	-0.38
State Sen	Colorado	48.57	47.32	47.67	-0.35
State Sen	New Hampshire	41.67	41.15	41.49	-0.34
State Sen	Kentucky	31.58	31.40	31.69	-0.30
State Sen	North Dakota	31.91	31.80	32.10	-0.30
State Sen	Missouri	26.47	25.99	26.26	-0.27

State Sen	Vermont	70.00	69.88	70.15	-0.27
State Sen	New Mexico	59.52	59.02	59.27	-0.25
State Sen	Indiana	20.00	19.81	20.04	-0.22
State Sen	Arkansas	34.29	34.52	34.71	-0.19
State Sen	Massachusetts	85.00	84.27	84.45	-0.18
State Sen	West Virginia	50.00	49.89	50.03	-0.14
State Sen	Kansas	20.00	19.53	19.66	-0.13
State Sen	Montana	42.00	41.96	42.07	-0.10
State Sen	Wyoming	13.33	13.12	13.11	0.01
State Sen	Oklahoma	16.67	16.32	16.23	0.10
State Sen	Pennsylvania	40.00	39.40	39.30	0.10
State Sen	Louisiana	35.90	35.89	35.77	0.12
State Sen	Georgia	32.14	31.67	31.54	0.13
State Sen	Connecticut	58.33	57.37	57.22	0.16
State Sen	Alabama	22.86	22.98	22.82	0.16
State Sen	Maryland	70.21	68.67	68.50	0.17
State Sen	Michigan	28.95	28.62	28.43	0.19
State Sen	Mississippi	40.38	40.47	40.28	0.19
State Sen	Hawaii	96.00	95.91	95.71	0.20
State Sen	North Carolina	32.00	31.20	30.99	0.21
State Sen	South Carolina	40.00	40.08	39.87	0.21
State Sen	Rhode Island	86.49	85.74	85.46	0.28
State Sen	Wisconsin	42.42	41.85	41.53	0.32
State Sen	New Jersey	60.00	57.88	57.52	0.36
State Sen	Virginia	47.50	45.82	45.46	0.36
State Sen	Tennessee	15.15	14.59	14.21	0.38
State Sen	South Dakota	22.86	22.94	22.52	0.43
State Sen	Alaska	30.00	29.40	28.97	0.43
State Sen	Illinois	66.10	64.69	64.25	0.44
State Sen	New York	49.21	46.19	45.69	0.51
State Sen	Delaware	57.14	56.71	56.17	0.53
State Sen	Florida	35.00	33.74	32.71	1.03
State Sen	Nevada	47.62	44.85	43.44	1.41
State Sen	Texas	35.48	33.67	32.26	1.41
State Sen	Arizona	43.33	41.40	39.67	1.73
State HS	Utah	16.00	15.39	16.87	-1.48
State HS	Idaho	20.00	19.98	21.36	-1.38
State HS	Washington	52.04	51.38	52.60	-1.22
State HS	Minnesota	46.27	45.36	46.30	-0.94
State HS	Hawaii	84.31	83.88	84.76	-0.88
State HS	Colorado	52.31	51.20	51.89	-0.68
State HS	New Hampshire	40.10	39.60	40.15	-0.55
State HS	Kentucky	54.00	53.83	54.29	-0.47
State HS	Iowa	43.00	42.44	42.86	-0.43
State HS	Maine	53.74	53.50	53.92	-0.41

State HS	Missouri	28.22	27.73	28.13	-0.40
State HS	Ohio	34.34	34.06	34.43	-0.37
State HS	Alaska	41.03	40.43	40.81	-0.37
State HS	Oregon	58.33	57.47	57.84	-0.37
State HS	North Dakota	24.47	24.31	24.66	-0.35
State HS	Montana	41.00	40.94	41.25	-0.31
State HS	Indiana	29.00	28.49	28.79	-0.29
State HS	Arkansas	36.00	36.22	36.48	-0.26
State HS	West Virginia	36.00	36.03	36.26	-0.23
State HS	Vermont	62.50	62.33	62.55	-0.22
State HS	Wyoming	15.00	14.88	15.09	-0.21
State HS	Massachusetts	77.50	76.37	76.51	-0.14
State HS	Connecticut	57.62	56.16	56.29	-0.13
State HS	Oklahoma	28.71	28.44	28.56	-0.12
State HS	Kansas	22.40	21.69	21.81	-0.12
State HS	Pennsylvania	41.38	40.81	40.90	-0.09
State HS	Georgia	34.08	33.59	33.59	0.00
State HS	South Carolina	37.10	37.31	37.30	0.02
State HS	Michigan	42.73	42.37	42.33	0.04
State HS	Virginia	34.00	32.54	32.47	0.07
State HS	Louisiana	40.78	40.87	40.78	0.08
State HS	Alabama	31.43	31.46	31.37	0.08
State HS	New Mexico	47.14	46.27	46.07	0.20
State HS	Rhode Island	85.14	84.39	84.18	0.21
State HS	California	65.00	63.20	62.96	0.24
State HS	North Carolina	38.33	37.62	37.37	0.25
State HS	Delaware	60.98	60.55	60.29	0.25
State HS	Wisconsin	36.36	35.72	35.46	0.26
State HS	New Jersey	65.00	63.04	62.75	0.29
State HS	Mississippi	39.34	39.32	39.00	0.32
State HS	Tennessee	26.26	25.70	25.36	0.34
State HS	New York	70.67	68.18	67.78	0.40
State HS	South Dakota	17.14	17.01	16.60	0.41
State HS	Maryland	64.54	62.74	62.31	0.43
State HS	Illinois	60.17	58.51	58.00	0.51
State HS	Florida	32.50	31.12	30.28	0.84
State HS	Arizona	40.00	38.09	36.56	1.52
State HS	Nevada	40.48	37.98	36.40	1.58
State HS	Texas	34.67	32.43	30.74	1.69
US HS	Washington	60.00	59.76	61.05	-1.29
US HS	Colorado	42.86	42.50	43.55	-1.05
US HS	Minnesota	62.50	62.34	63.25	-0.92
US HS	New Mexico	66.67	67.14	67.65	-0.51
US HS	Iowa	25.00	25.03	25.22	-0.20
US HS	South Carolina	14.29	14.34	14.50	-0.17
US HS	California	73.58	72.31	72.48	-0.16

US HS	Louisiana	16.67	16.50	16.59	-0.09
US HS	Alabama	14.29	14.37	14.44	-0.07
US HS	Kentucky	16.67	16.31	16.36	-0.06
US HS	Ohio	25.00	24.71	24.76	-0.05
US HS	Oregon	80.00	79.60	79.65	-0.05
US HS	Georgia	28.57	28.55	28.58	-0.03
US HS	Missouri	25.00	24.67	24.67	-0.01
US HS	Pennsylvania	27.78	27.23	27.23	0.00
US HS	North Dakota	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Vermont	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Kansas	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Connecticut	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Arkansas	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Hawaii	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	West Virginia	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Rhode Island	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Oklahoma	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Montana	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Alaska	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Utah	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Massachusetts	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	Delaware	100.00	100.00	100.00	0.00
US HS	South Dakota	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Wyoming	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Idaho	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
US HS	Maine	50.00	49.83	49.79	0.04
US HS	Michigan	35.71	35.44	35.35	0.09
US HS	New Hampshire	50.00	50.00	49.86	0.14
US HS	Wisconsin	37.50	37.06	36.90	0.16
US HS	Virginia	27.27	25.73	25.56	0.17
US HS	North Carolina	23.08	22.38	22.13	0.25
US HS	Maryland	87.50	86.81	86.54	0.27
US HS	Indiana	22.22	21.85	21.56	0.29
US HS	Tennessee	22.22	21.59	21.28	0.31
US HS	Mississippi	25.00	25.08	24.77	0.31
US HS	Nevada	25.00	22.44	22.04	0.41
US HS	Illinois	55.56	54.01	53.58	0.44
US HS	New Jersey	50.00	47.51	47.04	0.48
US HS	New York	66.67	64.36	63.79	0.57
US HS	Florida	37.04	36.26	35.57	0.69
US HS	Nebraska	33.33	32.88	32.12	0.76
US HS	Texas	30.56	28.57	26.75	1.83
US HS	Arizona	44.44	42.73	40.84	1.89